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COMMENT
THE TAXATION OF CARVED-OUT
PRODUCTION PAYMENTS
A production payment is a flexible device frequently used to
carve interests out of a larger royalty or working interest.
"Production payment," "oil payment," and "in-oil payment" can
be used as synonomous terms to describe the interest created when
the owner of the royalty or working interest transfers to another
the right to all or a fractional part of the transferor's share of
production free and clear of production costs with the duration of
the transferred interest measured in terms of barrels of oil, dollars
received, or in terms of time. Simultaneously with the increase
in the use of production payments has come the attempt by such
royalty or working interest owners to carve out production pay-
ments and use the carved-out portion for various purposes and
still achieve a favorable tax result, namely capital gains treat-
ment on the sale of such payment. Recent litigation on carved-out
production payments has centered around oil payments, but the
following discussion will also be applicable to sulfur payments,
and payments for limestone, natural gas, and any other depletable
asset.
The carved-out production payment may be created in either
of two ways. First, the grantor could make a complete conveyance
of his present mineral interest retaining a reversion. Second, the
grantor could convey a designated amount of the income from the
royalty or working interest to the grantee. The amount which the
grantee is to receive can be determined by limiting it to (1) a
specified time, e. g. the royalty payments for the next ten years,
(2) a specified dollar amount, e. g. the royalty payments to the
extent! of $10,000,000, or (3) a specified number of units pro-
duced, e. g. the oil royalties paid on the next 200,000 barrels
produced. The conveyances described above should be distin-
guished from a conveyance by the grantor of a fractional interest,
i. e. a conveyance that is not limited in one of the three ways set
out above, but is instead a fraction of the grantor's entire interest.
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If the conveyance of a fractional interest is a sale, the grantor
is entitled to capital gains; if it is a gift, he is entitled to be treated
as having made an ordinary gift of property. It is only where the
grantor conveys an interest of shorter duration than the expected
life of the property that the tax consequences are disputed.
SALE OF CARVED-OUT PRODUCTION PAYMENTS
The difficulties have arisen in this field of the law because the
cases have approached the problem of carved-out production pay-
ments from two wholly different and contradictory directions. One
view considers the production payment an ownership interest in
the oil in the ground. Acknowledging that a property interest in
oil is a capital asset, the courts following this view hold that the
sales of in-oil payments are sales of capital assets and thus subject
to capital gain treatment. However, the effect of the transaction
is anticipation of income as capital gain, whereas if the money
were received as the royalties accrued, it would be taxed as
ordinary income subject to depletion.'
The second view is that the oil itself is not sold. Only the right
to receive income from the property changes hands, and that shifts
only for the specified duration, to revert thereafter to the grantor.
Since only the right to income, i. e. the "fruit" of the "tree" of
property ownership changes hands, the grantor who has retained
the "tree" of ownership interest is not entitled to the benefit of
capital gain treatment, for he has not conveyed an interest in a
capital asset. The grantor has merely anticipated some income by
the assignment of it to the grantee.
2
Perhaps this latter view with its analogy of the "tree and fruit"
ignores the basic fact that conveyances by the grantor of the "fruit"
in the case of carved-out production payments also results in a
diminishing in the size of the "tree," and conveyances of enough
of the "fruit" will exhaust the "tree" itself. This objection is par-
ticularly applicable where the grantor has conveyed a carved-out
production payment out of a larger production payment created by
1 Caldwell v. Campbell, 218 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1955), 4 OIL & GAS REP. 305; and
see the cases cited in note 13.
2 Commissioner v. Hawn, 231 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1956), 5 On. & GAs REP. 855; and
G.C.M. 24849, CuM. BULL. 1946-1, 66, and I.T. 4003, Cum. BuLL. 1950-1, 10.
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someone else. E. g. the grantor with a $3,000,000 carved-out pro-
duction payment carves out a $2,000,000 payment and conveys it
to someone else. The grantor may have disposed of only his
"fruit," but it would appear that his "tree" has shrunk to a third
of its former size. In any event, the second view denies capital
gain treatment to the grantor in the conveyance of a carved-out pro-
duction payment, unless the grant could be considered substantial.
If the assignment of ordinary income is given capital gain treat-
ment, no one need pay a tax of over 25%, for anyone could assign
his anticipated income, e. g. salary or attorney's fees, to someone
else before receipt. This proposition is verified by the fact that
cases allowing capital gain in the sale of carved-out production
payments made it apparent that all income from the property
could be treated as capital gain.8 However, to obtain this tax bene-
fit, the income had to be assigned, and in every case the grantor
could expect to litigate the tax consequences of the assignment.
The following comment was made shortly before a case appeared
opposing the taxpayer's capital gain contention:
Any time a business group is successful in converting their operations
into capital gain rates without selling their complete interest, eventually
the Bureau will be successful in changing the law. 4
Case Law
The carved-out production payment is a flexible device, the
business and personal advantages of which are obvious. The prob-
lem facing the government is that, if such sales of depletable
economic units result in capital gain, any royalty owner or lessee
could convert his ordinary income from production into capital
gains by making frequent sales of short term interests. There would
be no difficulty in making such sales, because the vendor could
set an attractive price in the light of his tax savings, and thereby
find a ready market.5
A case in point showing how the royalty owner can convey a
carved-out portion of his interest and thereby anticipate future
8 3 R.I.A. FEFDERAL TAX COORDINATOR § N-3003; 2 MERTENs, LAW OF FFI)EAL INCOME
TAXATION § 18.13.
4 Hammonds and Ray, Oil Payments Revisited, 33 TAXES 349, at 352 (1955).
5 Kuntz, Assignments of Oil Payments, 31 TAXES 863 (1953).
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income at capital gain rates is that of John D. Hawn,6 decided by
the Tax Court in December, 1954. Hawn was the owner of a
carved-out oil payment given to him by his grandmother and orig-
inally amounting to $1,000,000. In 1949 he assigned this oil pay-
ment to a contractor, who in return agreed to build a house for
Hawn. By the terms of the contract, when the contractor had re-
ceived $120,000 the oil payment reverted to the taxpayer. The oil
payment reverted to Hawn in 19 months.
Thus, in that case the owner of a carved-out production payment
carved out of it a smaller payment and assigned it to a contractor.
Hawn claimed that his gain from the transaction was long term
capital gain, for he had held the property interest for more than
six months. The Commissioner contended that the gain realized
on the assignment was ordinary income, for the effect of the trans-
action was to anticipate income which if received as royalties
would be ordinary income subject to depletion. The carved-out
payment was of such short duration (19 months) that the Com-
missioner's argument seemed to have merit, but the Commissioner
admittedly had no cases directly on point with which to justify his
contention.7 The taxpayer, Hawn, did rely on several recent cases
showing that the assigned interest was an interest in the oil in
place and thus entitled to capital gain treatment.' The Tax Court
held, with six judges dissenting, that Hawn was entitled to capital
gain treatment on the sale, and the Commissioner appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Before the Fifth Circuit rendered its decision in the Hawn case,
it decided in January, 1955, the case of Caldwell v. Campbell.'
In the Caldwell case taxpayer had organized the D. K. Caldwell
Foundation as a tax-exempt organization. During the fiscal year
1948 the taxpayer conveyed royalty interests to the foundation,
which interests would revert to and revest in the taxpayer when
the foundation had received a certain sum of money. In return
6 23 T.C. 516 (1954), 4 OL & GAs REP. 208; later reversed by Commissioner v. Hawn,
231 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1956), 5 OIL & GAs REP'. 85S.
7 The Commissioner did rely on several regulations which would have subjected the
income to tax as ordinary depletable income from the property. G.C.M. 24849, Cums.
BULL. 1946.1, 66, which was later clarified by I.T. 4003, CUM. BULL. 1950-1, 10.
8 Lester A. Nordan, 22 T.C. 1132 (1954), 3 OIL & GAS REP. 1961; T. W. Lee, 42
B.T.A. 1217, aff'd 126 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1942).
9218 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1955), 4 OIL & GAs REP. 305.
19561
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
the taxpayer received notes of the foundation, which of necessity
would have to be paid for out of the income from the property.
The oil payment was expected to revert to the taxpayer in nine
to thirteen years. The Commissioner contended that the taxpayer's
gain was ordinary income, and the district court supported that
view.'0 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in an opinion
by Chief Judge Hutcheson, reversed the district court and held
that the transactions were bona fide sales of property and not
assignments of income, and that, therefore, the gain realized was
ordinary capital gain.
Judge Rives dissented in the Caldwell case, stating that:
It seems to me that, if by this process the taxpayer could convert his
ordinary income from these properties into capital gain, then hereafter
there will be no necessity for an owner of oil royalty interests to receive
therefrom ordinary income. He need only "convey" the oil payment
rights for one year, ten years, thirteen years, or such other period as
may be most profitable, and report his receipts as capital gains.1
Judge Rives added that the owner of oil royalty interests stands
upon the same footing as other taxpayers with the exception of the
depletion allowance. He analogized the situation to that of an
ordinary lessor under a long term lease, who anticipates income
by selling some of his annual rent notes, say ten or thirteen of
them. Judge Rives then asked, "Would that be a transfer of the
fruits or of the tree on which they grew?"'"
During the period from December, 1954, to March, 1956, num-
erous cases' 8 relied on the triumvirate of decisions formed by the
Tax Court's decision in the Hawn case, together with the Caldwell
case, and the earlier Nordan case.'4 These cases were nearly all
concerned with the treatment of carved-out oil payments, but one
10 45 AFTR 305 (1953).
11218 F.2d at 573.
12 Judge Rives cited the following case and authority to answer his own question:
Lum v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 356, and 2 MERT.Ns, LAW oF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION§ 18.12.
Is John Wrather, TC Memo 55-289 (1955), 4 On. & GAs REP. 1075; R. B. Cowden,
TC Memo 55-396 (1955), 4 On. & GAs REP. 1073; William Fleming, 24 T.C. 818 (1955),
4 OIL & GAS REP. 1609; A. J. Slagter, Jr., 24 T.C. 935 (1955), 4 OIL & GAS REP. 2057;
W. F. Weed, 24 T.C. 1025 (1955), 4 OIL & GAS REP. 2069; P. G. Lake, Inc., 24 T.C. 1016
(1955) ; and see O'Connor v. Scofield, infra note 19.
14Lester A. Nordan, 22 T.C. 1132 (1954), 3 OIL & GAS REP. 1961. This case deals
with gifts and will be discussed later. See also Wellen, Recent Developments in the
Taxation of Oil and Gas Interests, SIXTH ANN. INST. ON OIL & GAS LAW & TAXAMON,
479, 485-491 (1955), where these three cases are discussed.
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case dealt with a carved-out sulfur payment." Still another case
allowed capital gain treatment where the oil payment was conveyed
in order to pay off pre-existing debts.'"
Finally on March 27, 1956, the Fifth Circuit handed down a
unanimous decision in the Hawn case." The decision of the Tax
Court was reversed and the cause was remanded. The court held
that the assignment of the oil payment until $120,000 had been
received was insubstantial in amount relative to the total oil pay-
ment owned by Hawn at that time ($854,993.25). Moreover, the
payment of $120,000 plus interest took about 19 months, which
period was insubstantial in time. The transfer, therefore, was
merely a transfer of income and not a sale of a capital asset.
The Caldwell case was not overruled by this latest decision. In
view of the strong language of Chief Judge Hutcheson in the
Caldwell case, the court had to distinguish carefully to reach the
opposite result. This distinction was grounded on substantiality in
time and amount of the carved-out payments. A 9 to 13 year pay
out period out of a property with an estimated life of 25 years
was considered substantial in the Caldwell case. A 19 month pay
out period out of a property with a life of presumably 10 to eleven
years was held to be insubstantial in the Hawn decision. I" The
test of substantiality leaves much to be desired when it comes to
cases between these two extremes. Consider for example the case
of O'Connor v. Scofield,'9 where the grantor carved out an oil
payment which reverted to him in less than two years. A district
court 0 held that the $10,000,000 payment which had been carved
out was substantial, so that the sale of it did not result in the
anticipation of ordinary income. If this decision is appealed, it
will be interesting to note whether the Court of Appeals will apply
the substantiality test of the Hawn case or the earlier rule of the
Caldwell case.
15 W. F. Weed, 24 T.C. 1025 (1955), 4 OL & GAS REP. 2069.
16 P. G. Lake, Inc., 24 T.C. 1016 (1955).
17 Commissioner v. Hawn, 231 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1956), 5 OIL & GAS REP. 855.
18 See the discussion note in 5 OIL & GAS REP. at 862.
19 P-H 1956-72, 538 (1956), 5 OIL & GAS REP. 1094.
20 The Scofield case was decided by the United States District Court for the Western





These cases show a conflict which cannot be adequately under-
stood without a basic understanding of the principles underlying
their contrasting results. If an oil payment is necessarily property,
i. e. a capital asset, it would not seem to matter how substantial
the transfer - it would be entitled to capital gain rates no matter
how insubstantial it appears in relation to the grantor's original
interest. There are a number of cases illustrating the principle that
an oil payment is an interest in the oil in place.2' The United
States Supreme Court in several cases has held that the holder of
an oil payment is to be regarded as the owner of the oil in place.22
The following quotation from Anderson v. Helvering shows the
approach taken by the Supreme Court in arriving at that result:
The holder of an oil payment right, as an original proposition, might
be regarded as having no capital investment in the oil and gas in
place. The value of the right, even though dependent upon the extent of
oil reserves, is fixed at the moment of creation and does not vary di-
rectly with the severance of the minerals from the soil. In this sense it
resembles the right to cash payment more closely than the right to
royalty payments. Yet it does depend upon the production of oil, ordi-
narily can be realized upon only over a period of years, and permits of a
simple and convenient allocation between lessor and lessee of both
the gross income and the allowance for depletion. 23
Accordingly the court held that ordinarily oil payments should be
treated as interests in the oil in place, but where the grantor also
gives a lien on the land to guarantee the income to the grantee,
the grantee was not entitled to depletion, for he held a right to
income rather than an ownership interest in the oil.
If the oil payment (or any other carved-out production pay-
ment) is an interest in the minerals in place, it would seem that it
could be sold as a capital asset. On the other hand, persuasive
cases present the following argument to the contrary with respect
to the income from oil leases:
21 See for example, T. W. Lee, 42 B.T.A. 1217, aff'd, 126 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1942),
which further held that taxpayer as owner of the oil in place must look to depletion
for recovery of his costs, and could not recoup the cost of his oil payment out of pro-
duction before being required to report any of the proceeds as gross income, since the
receipts of oil payments are returns of income and not of capital. See also note 22.
22 Thomas v. Perkins, 301 U.S. 655 (1937); Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404
(1940) ; but cf. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
22 310 U.S. at 410-411.
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That income would have come to plaintiff at least as certainly as
expected salary would come to an employed person, or expected divi-
dends or interest would come to the holder of stocks or bonds. The
question then is whether it is tolerable, when an income tax is being
imposed upon citizens generally, to permit particular persons to rid
themselves of their income and their share of income tax by assignment
of the expected income in advance of its receipt to avoid the tax. 4
The Rudco case" answered its own question by reference to the
following cases: Lucas v. Earl, 6 which had held that a person
could not achieve that result by assigning his salary before it was
paid; Harrison v. Schaffner,27 which had held that one entitled
to income from a trust could not escape income taxes by assigning
part of the future income to his children, for the gift by a life
beneficiary of a right to receive a specified amount of income for
the period of one year was an anticipatory assignment of future
income rather than a transfer of a substantial equitable interest in
the trust estate; Helvering v. Horst,"s which had held that the
owner of an interest-bearing bond could not, by detaching interest-
bearing coupons before they became due and giving them to his
son, avoid paying an income tax on the interest, when collected,
as if it had been paid to him. These cases dealt with assignments
by a taxpayer attempting to completely avoid an income tax on
the amounts involved, but the same logical principles apply to
situations where the taxpayer attempts by advance assignment to
convert his income from ordinary to capital gain rates.
It has been demonstrated that it makes a big difference to the
grantor whether the transaction is considered a sale of a capital
asset or mere anticipation of income. Does it make any difference
taxwise to the grantee-purchaser of that income? Apparently not.
Take for example the contractor in the Hawn case. For a valuable
consideration, viz. the contractor's agreement to build Hawn a
house, Hawn transferred an oil payment to the contractor. There-
after, the contractor was to be the owner of the oil payment until
he collected $120,000, when it was to revert to Hawn. In 1949
the contractor collected $12,782.53 from the oil payment. That
24 The quotation is taken from Rudco Oil & Gas Co. v. U.S., 113 Ct. Cl. 206 at 215,
82 F. Supp. 746 at 751 (1949), and see intra note 44.
25 Supra, note 24.
26281 U.S. 111 (1930).
2T 312 U.S. 579 (1941).
28311 U.S. 112 (1940).
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amount was gross income to him from oil production, and he was
entitled to depletion. It was not income to Hawn under either
theory. In the same year the contractor paid Hawn $20,809.79
in the form of construction work completed. This is the amount in
controversy. Under the sale of a capital asset theory, it is capital
gain; but under the assignment of income theory, it is ordinary
income subject to depletion. Thus, we are not concerned with
the amount received by the grantee from the oil payment; we are
only concerned with the amount paid to the grantor by the grantee
in return for the oil payment. Under either approach, the tax
consequences upon the grantee-purchaser are identical.
It is obvious from all of the foregoing discusion that there is
a virtually irreconcilable conflict between the two lines of cases.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals made an effort to reconcile this
conflict with its substantiality of interest test, but that test is in-
definite and leaves much to be desired. Time cannot be the only
test; relative values of the property carved-out and the property
retained must also be considered. An oil payment which will pay
out in two years, if carved out of a property which will pay out
in three years, is a substantial interest in the larger property.
Assume that a property will pay out in twenty years, but because
of the decline in production and reserve estimates the eighteen years
of remaining life have a present value of considerably less than
the present value of the initial two years. In such case, a two year
carved-out interest, since it represents a major part of the market
value, would also be a substantial interest.2 9
Proposed Legislation
Because of the conflict in the case law, there is presently before
Congress a bill for amending the Internal Revenue Code which
would make clear the law governing the taxation of carved-out pro-
duction payments.8" It seems reasonably certain that in the near
future this bill or some similar proposal will be adopted, for the
29 5 OIL & GAs REP. 862.
80 H.R. 9559, 84th Cong., 2nd Session (1956). This bill is reproduced in full in
5 OIL AND GAS TAX QUARTERLY 165 (April 1956), and in 5 OIL & GAS REP. 909.
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need for legislation is readily apparent.81 Since there are num-
erous proposals to modify H. R. 9559,2 there will be no attempt
in this article to quote it extensively in its present form.
Basically the proposed law provides that the consideration re-
ceived by the transferor from the sale or exchange of a carved-
out production payment shall be considered income subject to the
allowance for depletion."3 The anticipation of the income approach
would be definitely established by the proposed statute.
The basic rule would not apply where the proceeds received are
pledged for the development of the property from which the pro-
duction payment is carved or where the production payment is
transfered in return for services, materials, or supplies used in
the development of the property from which such payment is
carved.3" This exception to the basic rule would not apply to the
extent that the carved-out production payment is created to dis-
charge a liability previously created and fixed in amount.35 These
exceptions merely continue the tax treatment accorded to such
transfers under the present law and administrative ruling. 6
Even if a proposal similar to H. R. 9559 is not enacted into law,
the Hawn decision will provide for ordinary income treatment
where the production payment does not meet the substantiality of
interest test. Of course, if such legislation is adopted, the substan-
tiality of interest test will no longer be important, and the proceeds
from the sale of a carved-out production payment would be or-
dinary income, unless the proceeds are used for the exploration
or development of such property. From the point of view of cer-
tainty, it would be far better to have a Congressional enactment
S1 A recent comment in the Harvard Law Review suggested the Congress or the Com-
missioner might promulgate a rule that a transfer of an oil payment would be taxed
at ordinary rates where the price paid is equal to or greater than the face amount of
the oil payment discounted for a given length of time at a specified rate. The regulation
or statute would set a discount rate low enough and a discount period short enough
to assure that a purchase price in excess of this discounted value would only be paid
for an oil payment on which there was very little risk that the entire face value would
not be recovered over the estimated pay off time. Thus, the taxpayer-grantor would have
to sell at a price below this artificially determined figure in order to receive capital
gain rates. Distinguishing Ordinary Income from Capital Can where Rights to Future
Income are Sold, 69 HAltv.L.REv. 737 (1956).
32 Supra, note 30.
53 H.R. 9559 § 1 proposes to do this by adding a new section 633 to the INT. REV
CODE of 1954. The basic rule would be found in § 633 (a) (1).
34 Proposed new § 633(a) (2) to the INT. REv. CODE of 1954.
s5 Ibid.
'
6 G.C.M. 22730, Cum. BuLL. 1941-1, 214; G.C.M. 24849, CUM. BuL.. 1946-1, 66
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governing the question than to leave the matter to the fate of being
decided under the present case law and treasury regulations."
The vagueness of the substantiality of interest test and the already
demonstrated possibility of changed attitude on the part of the
courts militate in favor of passage of a law to regulate the situation.
GIFT AND DISTRIBUTION OF CARVED-OUT PRODUCTION PAYMENTS
Case Law and Underlying Principles
Entirely different issues in the area of taxing carved-out produc-
tion payments are presented where the grantor makes a gift of
the carved-out interest. First, if the gift is charitable there is the
problem of the "double deduction." Is the donor entitled to have
the amount left out of his gross income and in addition receive a
charitable deduction for the gift? Second, is the donor taxable on
the income from the carved-out payment as it accrues to the donee
under the theory of assignment of income? Under the doctrine of
Lucas v. Earl, Helvering v. Horst, and Harrison v. Schaffner,8
it would seem that a donor must give away a substantial or owner-
ship interest, i. e. the "tree" rather than the "fruit," in order to
avoid being taxed as having received the income.
However, in the case of Lester A. Nordan89 the taxpayer donated
to a church an oil payment with reversion to the taxpayer after
the church had received $115,000, and the Tax Court held that
Nordan was entitled to a charitable deduction for the fair market
value of the gift at the time it was made. The Tax Court made no
attempt to determine whether the carved-out payment was a sub-
stantial part of the value of the 1/8th royalty out of which it was
to be paid. The court concluded:
The petitioners retained only a reversionary interest in the property.
Cases where the right to receive income in the future was transferrd or
where title to the income producing property was retained are not in
point.40
The court also held that, since no income had accrued at the date
87 The Commissioner's attempt in Caldwell v. Campbell to rely on G.C.M. 24849 and
I.T. 4003 was met by the statement in the majority opinion that these were "opinions
having no more binding or legal force than the opinions of any lawyer." Cf. U.S. v.
Bennett, 186 F.2d 407 at 410 (5th Cir. 1951).
88 Supra, notes 26-28.
39 22 T.C. 1132 (i954), 3 O. & GAs REP. 1961, noted in 9 Sw.L.J. 127.
40 22 T.C. at 1134.
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of gift and all the disputed income was earned after that date,
the Commissioner had erred in attributing income from the pro-
duction payment to the taxpayer after the date of the conveyance
to the church.
By virtue of this decision the holder of an oil and gas interest
may give oil payments to charitable institutions and thereby re-
ceive increased total income after taxes. The savings arise out of a
"double deduction" to which such taxpayers are entitled, i. e. (1)
the income from the oil payment is not included in gross income,
and (2) the gift gives rise to a charitable deduction. For example,
a married taxpayer with a $300,000 oil income per year may give
a $50,000 oil payment (worth $45,000) and have $18,073 more
after taxes than if he had not been so charitable. For taxpayers in
lower brackets, the same principle would give the donor $600
more after taxes if he gave a $5,000 oil payment (worth face
value) out of a $70,000 annual income.4' Thus, taxpayers now
have a new incentive to stimulate their generosity. Not only is it
more blessed to give than to receive, but also the taxpayer will
realize more hard cash for himself after taxes as a result of the
donation.
This result, made possible by the "double deduction," is not
limited to gifts of carved-out production payments. Any time a
taxpayer can give away something of value without being taxed as
having realized that value himself, the effect will be the same.42
The problem of the "double deduction" and whether it should be
corrected by eliminating one deduction or the other are outside
the scope of this article. What is important in the field of carved-
out production payments is that the taxpayer was allowed by the
Nordan decision to make a gift of an oil payment with the same
tax consequences as if the gift had been an oil royalty, i. e. a
conveyance limited only by the length of the lease. The Commis-
sioner in I. T. 4003"' eliminated any distinction between short-
lived and long-lived oil payments, and provided that all carved-
out production payments were assignments of future income. The
41 See the discussion note in 3 OIL & GAS REP. 1963, from which these examples were
taken. The computation of the tax is shown, and the problem of the double deduction
briefly discussed.
42 For example, Cambell v. Prothro, 209 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1954), allowed a "double
deduction" in the gift to a charity of several hundred calves.
48 CuM. BuLL. 1950-1, 10.
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Commissioner's contention was supported by judicial approval in
the Rudco case,"' but his ruling seems to have been ignored in the
Nordan case, for as quoted above the court held that cases dealing
with the assignment of future income were not in point.
Proposed Legislation
H. R. 9559 and other proposed legislation on the subject would
govern the taxation of gifts (as well as sales) of carved-out pro-
duction payments. The general rule under H. R. 9559 would be
that the donor of such a gift would be treated as having received
income subject to the allowance for depletion as the income accrued
to the donee. The donee would be treated as having received a
gift of such proceeds."
The above general rule would effectively abrogate the rule of
the Nordan case, for the donor would be taxable on the income re-
ceived. But that general rule would not always apply where the
donation was to charity." In cases of gifts to charities, the donor
would not be taxable on the income if the payment would be ex-
pected to pay out over a period of at least two years."' Thus, in
the case of gifts to charity we have a proposed stautory "substan-
tiality of interest" test, and if the period over which the property
income is to be paid to the charity is long enough the income
would not be taxable to the donor. Where the pay out period is
too short, it would be the "fruit," rather than part of the "tree,"
which has been donated.
Other provisions of H. R. 9559 deal with varied problems re-
lating to carved-out production payments. Sections 1221 and 1231
of the Internal Revenue Code would be amended to provide that
in no event should a sale or exchange of a carved-out production
payment be considered the sale of exchange of either a capital
asset or property used in trade or business."' Sub-paragraph E
would be added to section 170(b) (1) to provide that there shall
44 Rudco Oil & Gas Co. v. U.S., 113 Ct.Cl. 206, 82 F.Supp. 746 (1949), where it was
held that oil payments granted by the taxpayer corporation to its stockholders in pro-
portion to their stock ownership constituted an assignment of future income, and were
therefore taxable income to the corporation.
4"Proposed new § 633(b) (1) to the INT. REv. CODE of 1954.
46 As described in II 170(b) (1) (A) of the INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954.
4 Proposed new § 633(b) (2).
'8 H.R. 9559 §§ 6 & 7 would so amend the INT. REV. CODE of 1954.
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be no charitable deduction allowed for the gift of a carved-out
production payment, where the value of the retained reversion
exceeds 5% of the value of the carved-out payment.49 This last
provision is consistent with the treatment under existing law ac-
corded to transfers in trust.5 This provision would set up another
statutory "substantiality of interest" test to support the theory
for which the Commissioner had contended in the Nordan case.
Still other sections of the proposed H. R. 9559 deal with cor-
porations which distribute carved-out production payments." Sec-
tion 311 of the Code would be amended by adding subsection (d)
to provide that distributions of carved-out production payments
as dividends would be treated as if the corporation had sold such
payment and distributed the proceeds. 2 Finally, section 351 (a)
would be amended to make clear that exchanges of carved-out pro-
duction payments will not be given the tax-free exchange treatment
generally accorded transfers to controlled corporations."'
CONCLUSION
The effects of H. R. 9559 have been considered because it seems
quite probable that this bill or similar legislation will be enacted
into law in the reasonably near future, possibly before this article
is published." It would be impossible to describe thoroughly the
taxation of carved-out production payments without mentioning
how it is proposed that Congress tax them in the future. H. R. 9559,
in addition to being a proposed statute, also indicates the Treas-
ury's position on the taxation of these interests. In view of the
Hawn decision, it is submitted that the Treasury's position will be
accorded greater weight in the Fifth Circuit in the future.
This article has considered the carved-out production payment
and the extent to which it has been used in the past to avoid taxes,
and some consideration has been given to proposals governing the
49 H.R. 9559 § 2.50 Section 170(b) (1) (D) of the INT. REv. CODE of 1954 deals with transfers in trust.
51 See for example the Rudco case in note 44.
52 H.R. 9559 § 3.
58 H.R. 9559 § 4.
54H.R. 9559 § 8 deals with the aggregation of properties, which problem is beyond
the scope of this article. H.R. 9559 § 9 provides that the effective date of the proposed
amendments to the Internal Revenue Code would be February 27, 1956. No inference
is to be drawn from the enactment of the bill with respect to transactions on February
27, 1956, or prior thereto.
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taxation of them in the future. The question remains, can carved.
out production payments be used, now and in the future, to obtain
tax savings. The answer is a definite "yes," for even though the
recent Hawn decision and H. R. 9559 may close the objectionable
loopholes, other possibilities for tax maneuvering through the use
of such payments are now and in the foreseeable future will be
permitted by the Treasury. For example:
1. A producer might offset an expected loss in a given taxable year by
selling an oil payment and anticipating future income, too.
2. He might also level out his earnings between low and high income
years.
3. If a particular year's development and operating costs were so great
as to eliminate the percentage-depletion allowance by reason of the
50% of net income limitation, the taxpayer might consider making
the percentage-depletion allowance available by contracting for an-
other to perform development operations in exchange for an oil
payment.
4. He might pledge the oil payment for development of the property,
with resulting disposition of income to the pledgee.
5. Where the oil payment constituted the entire depletable interest of
the assignor, as was true in the case of a retained as distinguished
from a carved-out, oil payment, that retained interest could be dis-
posed of as a capital asset.
6. Where the oil payment constituted a" fraction of the assignor's
depletable interest in the property, but such fractional interest ex-
tended over the entire life of the property, the Treasury had no
quarrel with its assignment."5
The last of the six is not a true carved-out production payment. It
is a fractional interest or overriding royalty, but it would seem
wise to remember that by conveying one's entire interest or a frac-
tional part thereof, instead of a carved-out production payment,
all of the problems with which this article has been concerned
can be avoided.
Robert N. Best
55 Kuntz, Oil Payments Revisited, 31 TAxEs 863 (1953).
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